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“Perchance to dream”
Personality modifications
and criminal liability : 
a nineteenth-century debate between psychiatry and law
Paolo Marchetti1
At the end of the nineteenth century, psychiatry ‘discovered’ some new 
pathologies such as split personality. These pathologies put into question the 
traditional reassuring image of human beings as capable of fully  controlling 
his/her behaviour. The aim of this article is to cast new light on how the 
discovery by psychiatry of certain mental disorders questioned the unitary 
vision of the human mind previously shared and accepted by legal theory and 
medical sciences. Certain psychiatrists maintained that some actions seemed 
to be determined by unconscious forces within an individual, even without any 
obvious mental illness. These observations challenged the concept of legal 
liability which had previously been accepted by most legal scholars, and gave 
rise to a lively debate between medicine and law.
À la fin du XIXe siècle, la psychiatrie ‘découvrit’ quelques nouvelles 
maladies,  comme par exemple la double personnalité, lesquelles mettaient en 
question  l’idée, rassurante,  d’un être humain maître de soi. Cet article essaie 
de mettre en évidence  comment  l’émergence de ces troubles du  comportement 
semblait ébranler la vision unitaire de  l’homme, que le droit et la médicine se 
devaient jusque-là de partager.  D’après certains psychiatres, même dans le 
cas des maladies mentales non déclarées plusieurs actions du sujet semblaient 
être  conditionnées per ses forces inconscientes. Ces remarques se heurtèrent 
à  l’idée de la responsabilité juridique affirmée par la plupart des juristes et 
donna lieu à un débat houleux entre médecine et droit.
1. DOUBLE PERSONALITY AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY : THE FELIDA X CASE
Felida was a girl from Bordeaux. Intelligent, anxious, and melancholic. In 1858, when she was fourteen, she began to show strange behavior. She would 
fall into sudden torpors from which she could not be roused. Later she would wake 
up again and her personality seemed totally changed. She appeared more good-
humored and extrovert. But this state – that Eugène Azam later described as her 
‘second  condition’ – would last only for a few hours. In the same way as her new 
1 Paolo Marchetti is full professor of Legal History at the University of Teramo (Italy). He has pub-
lished major works on the history of penal law and Criminology :  L’armata del crimine. Teoria e re-
pressione della recidiva in Italia, Ancona, Cattedrale, 2008 ; ‘Le “sentinelle del male”.  L’invenzione 
ottocentesca del criminale nemico della società tra naturalismo giuridico e normativismo psichi-
atrico’, in Quaderni fiorentini, 2009, 38, 2, pp. 1009-180 ;  L’Inconscio in tribunale. Azioni incoscienti 
e diritto penale. Da Charcot alle neuroscienze, Milano, Franco Angeli, 2014.
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personality had shown itself, it would go away, and the previous Felida resurfaced. 
The phenomenon repeated itself regularly on a daily basis. Over the years, the 
periods during which the girl fell into her ‘second state’ grew longer, until they lasted 
for several months. The strange fact is that the two personalities  communicated in 
an asymmetric way. Felida, when in her ‘second  condition’, remembered all that had 
happened in her normal state, but when she came back to her ordinary self she had 
absolutely no memory of what had occured in her parallel existence. Nevertheless, 
under both  conditions the psychological state of the girl did not demonstrate any 
alteration. Her mind was intact, only her character was different.
The Felida case is one of the best known and quoted in medical literature 
between the nineteenth and twentieth century. Every book that deals with personality 
alteration refers to this case in a more or less detailed form. This is the case to which 
Eugène Azam (the physician who treated her for a long time) owes his fame. Without 
Felida (to be more precise, Felida X, as Azam called the girl) it is very probable that 
no one would have remembered the name of this otherwise obscure physician from 
Bordeaux.
Azam brought the clinical history of this young girl to public attention in 1876 
through an article published in the Revue scientifique.2 He would treat the same case 
again, several times, until the publication in 1887 of the volume entitled Hypnotisme, 
double  conscience et altérations de la personnalité in which the story of Felida 
occupies most of the pages.3
Even if the Felida case is not the first of which the public has knowledge,4 the 
subject of split personalities, after  Azam’s work, begins to be studied in depth 
by  contemporary psychiatry, in spite of some initial mistrust,5 and not only by 
psychiatrists, because the subject of the ‘double’ became a fashionable narrative 
in late nineteenth-century literature. Some novels (among which the Strange Case 
of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde by Robert Louis Stevenson represents the best known 
tale) made use of this odd pathology to invent stories capable of arousing public 
curiosity.6
The importance of this stylistic mixture between description of clinical cases 
and literary fiction cannot be totally ignored. The narrative of the bizarre existential 
vicissitudes that involve the life of several patients seems to correspond to a literary 
dimension that reached its high point in the really successful narratives of clinical 
cases under Freudian analysis, which are written as if they were detective novels. 
In a similar vein, but with a changed point of view, fictional literature, which was 
2 Azam (1876).
3 Azam (1887).
4 On the Felida case see Carroy (1992). The cases of split personality known in the scientific literature 
before Felida are related by Hacking (1996). On Felida and the following cases of split or multiple 
personalities see pp. 222sq. On this matter please see also Carroy (2001, pp. 39-49) and Carroy 
(2001, pp. 43-73).
5 On the renewed interest that psychiatry has shown to pathological dissociation that were being 
 included into the nosographic category, see Fornari (2008, pp. 347sq.).
6 Mintorn (1880) ; Lindau (1893) ; Hennique (1899) ; Claretie (1908). Charles Richet, the 1913 Nobel 
prize-winner for medicine, published (under the name of Charles Epheyre) two novels about the 
themes of split personality and hypnotism : Epheyre (1889, 1887). On this subject see Carroy (1993) ; 
Herdman (1990).
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inspired by this kind of psychiatric vicissitudes, would often take the form of a 
clinical case.7
Beyond this charming  confusion of genres, we have to point out that in the 
medical literature of that period (as well as in the legal literature), the story of 
the case – or cases – under  consideration assumes a primary role in the  author’s 
narrative strategy. The case stories were called upon not only to uphold and support 
the scientific hypothesis under discussion, but became themselves an integral and 
unavoidable part of an elaborate reasoning that would have become ineffectual and 
lightweight, if deprived of their literary dimension. Moreover, a case story would 
be referred to countless times by all authors writing on the same issue, thus giving 
to the modern reader a sense of boredom by being presented with the same facts, 
if not the same words. Still, in spite of the ‘seriality’ of case histories, the narrative 
of the most sensational episodes referred to by the specialized literature at that time 
is inevitable for whoever is interested in reconstructing, from a historical point of 
view, the  conceptual universe that links itself to these small clinical or experimental 
dramas. The stories of these petty existential vicissitudes were the indispensable 
mental framework that  comes to life behind their development.
There is another reason that makes the case of Felida X very interesting (or, 
at least, makes it interesting in relation to the discourse dealt with in these pages). 
Azam did not need long time to realize that the strange behavior of his patient 
 constituted an authentic dilemma, not only for medical science at that time. The 
curious existence of Felida posed serious questions in juridicalterms, in particular 
with regard to the question of penal liability.8 Indeed, if the ill-fated girl (or every 
other person in her situation)  committed a crime in her ‘second  condition’, would 
she be called to answer for it in court ? The problem raised by Azam was not without 
foundation. If not  considered thoroughly, one might be forced into the absurd 
 conclusion that a person could be punished for behavior of which he or she had 
no memory at all ; behavior that could be linked to this person only in the material 
sense. This would lead towards obscruing the deeper logic of penal punishment 
which, by  common opinion,  consisted of retribution by the  community against the 
person guilty of acting against the rules of civil coexistence, as well as functioned as 
deterrence against repetition of the act by the  condemned person.
To provide an answer to this question, Azam  consulted several judges and legal 
scholars from Bordeaux who answered, in general, that the criminal responsability 
of such a subject had to be  considered with leniency. After all – and this was the 
argument of one answer that Azam quoted in full – in both  conditions Felida 
maintained her mind intact and her actions were led by  conscious will ; both these 
were the necessary and sufficient  conditions for  considering a subject legally 
responsible, even with diminished responsibility. The anonymous lawyer quoted by 
Azam did not deny that the case was not easy to solve. For instance, there were 
crimes such as misappropriation in which the awareness of the things belonging to a 
different person was an indispensable  condition for the punishment of the offender. 
And in this case, the total absence of memory had to play a key role in any case for 
innocence. The legal expert did not deny that many psychiatrists disputed the idea of 
7 See Revel, Passeron (eds) (2005), with particular reference to Carroy (2005, pp. 201-228) and Ferrari 
(1985). For the legal literature see the several essays collected in Schönert, Imm, Linder (eds) (1991).
8 Azam (1887, pp. 184sq.).
80 PAOLO MARCHETTI
partial mental illness. For these psychiatrists the profound alteration of some mental 
faculties necessarily affected the whole psyche of the person. Like the majority of 
his colleagues, the author of the reply was inclined to recognise reduced liability for 
an individual who had  committed a crime while in this  condition. Nonetheless, he 
suggested leaving the resolution of the specific judicial problem to the judge who 
would  consider it on a case-by-case basis.
However, these  conclusions did not obtain a general  consensus.9 Azam himself 
shared in his book the opinion of Jean-François-Charles Dufay who, with reference 
only to  Felida’s case and on the question of split personality, declared himself 
in favour of  complete legal irresponsibility of the persons suffering from such a 
pathology, irrespective of the  condition of personality at the moment of the crime.10 
After all, the French physician and politician asked himself how it was possible to 
establish which of the various personalities of an individual was normal and which 
pathological. It was hysteria that dominated the whole existence of these persons 
and for this reason they had to be declared mentally ill, thus unaccountable in legal 
terms.
2. “IS IT TRUE OR AM I DREAMING ?”
THE CRIMINAL SLEEPWALKER
The first answer to the question posed by Azam  concerning the criminal liability 
of Felida relates to the state of sleepwalking. It is precisely the state of sleeping and 
dreaming that allowed us to get insight into the phenomenon of split personality 
with some degree of cohesion – at least at the psychiatric level. Yet, as Foucault 
writes, the equation of madness/dream was proposed by Jules Baillarger already 
by the mid-nineteenth century and at that time this position caused a radical change 
in the epistemological organization of psychiatric science.11 Baillarger asserted that 
the element that characterized the behaviour of a madman was the fact of living 
in a dream- condition. But in this state, the problem stemmed from the lack of free 
will, rather than the person acting with a distorted sence of reality. As a source of 
involuntary processes, the dream became the model for every mental illness, thus 
moving the focus of the diagnosis of mental illness from balancing truth against 
untruth, as was the previously accepted psychiatric approach, to a question about 
voluntary or involuntary action.12
In this  context, the recourse to the dream acted out by the sleepwalker represented 
not only the point of reference where the phenomenon of split personality was 
anchored (Azam defined Felida a “total somnambulist”13), but also designated every 
 9 Georges Gilles de la Tourette remembered how, during the Congress of the French Association for 
the Development of the Sciences in Paris in 1878, the issue had been discussed in detail and they 
had not found a  common point of view  concerning criminal liability of a person suffering from split 
personality (Gilles de la Tourette, 1889, p. 257).
10 Azam (1887, pp. 190sq.). The issue has been discussed by Dufay in an article which appeared in the 
Revue Scientifique in 1879.
11 On the relationships between dreams and madness in nineteenth-century psychiatry see James 
(1995). See also Carroy (2012, pp. 53sq.).
12 Foucault (2007, pp. 147-148). 
13 Azam (1887, p. 185).
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other state of alteration in the personality. The hypnotic practice itself was defined 
as “induced somnambulism”, almost as if the psychiatrists wanted to emphasise 
the  common roots of behaviors that led the person towards a  conduct beyond the 
 control of free will, which could only be deciphered with reference to a kind of 
dream automatism. This opinion was stressed by Jules Liégeois, the French jurist 
who devoted himself most fully to the subject of personality modification and its 
implications in law. According to Liégeois, people like Felida, when passing into 
the ‘second  condition’, would enter a kind of sleep, which was characterised by 
having all the appearances of the state of being awake. And for this reason they 
could not be  considered responsible for their actions, at least, not for those ones 
done within the ‘second  condition’.14 The same thing happened for individuals 
under hypnosis. Liégeois asserted that, after all, the sleepwalker like the hypnotized 
subject was a dreamer. The only difference between the two  conditions was that the 
natural sleepwalker did not receive orders from the outside world, and his will was 
not forced by any alien strength. On the  contrary, in the artificial sleepwalker it was 
possible to seize his will and thereby direct his actions.15
Of course, the phenomenon of split personality posed more  complex problems 
in the medical-legal sphere than those arising from somnambulism. Azam himself 
did not to share the opinion of Dufay, who argued that people who showed signs of 
split personality were in fact suffering from hysteria, and therefore they could not 
be  considered accountable for crimes they might  commit – whether in the first, or in 
the second  condition. Azam wrote that  Dufay’s position was untenable, if nothing 
else, due to the fact that a great number of women were affected by hysteria, 
and it was not viable to acquit them all on the grounds that they were mentally 
incapable.16 A lot of doubts centered around the problem of the relationship between 
the first and the second personality. A lot of authors asked themselves whether it 
was possible always to  consider the first as the normal  condition, given that, in 
many cases, the modified state of the personality lasted much longer than the first 
 condition.17 In spite of these perplexities, it was nevertheless somnambulism that 
was to become the paradigm for references to the phenomenon of split personality 
in the medical-legal discourse. After all, the issue  concerning crimes  committed in 
the sleepwalking state was a subject to which law and moral philosophy had long 
had to find practical solutions.18
The recognition that sleepwalkers could not be held legally responsible did, 
in fact, not  come about without  conflict. At the beginning of the nineteenth 
century two prominent authors like François-Emmanuel Fodéré and Johann 
Cristoph Hoffbauer had expressed several perplexities on this point. The 
former had excluded the liability of the sleepwalker only in the case in which 
his/her behavior was the  consequence of an illness. In the absence of any 
medical  condition, the  sleepwalker’s action had to be  considered the fruit of 
bad principles and malicious ideas that the person supposedly  cultivated while 
14 Liégeois (1889, pp. 611-613).
15 Liégeois (1889, p. 439).
16 Liégeois (1889, p. 201).
17 Gilles de la Tourette (1889, p. 258).
18 Alimena (1896, vol. 3, pp. 122sq.).
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awake, and for this reason he/she could be not excused from any reproach.19 
For Hoffbauer, the  sleepwalker’s liability did not originate from the integrity 
of a  person’s intelligence, but because he/she had not taken the necessary steps 
to prevent harmful events, although being fully aware of his/her  condition20.
During the nineteenth century these positions (influenced without any doubt by 
the legal tradition of the Ancien Régime and linked to a unitary view of the human 
personality) lost their importance, even if they  continued to have some isolated 
supporters.21 One was Claude Joseph Tissot, who argued that if a sleepwalker killed a 
sworn enemy, he/she must be punished, although with a lighter sentence.22 Similarly 
Joseph Briand maintained that liability, or at least  culpability, could not be excluded 
a priori.23
In any case, the  sleepwalker’s behavior was, in the medical discourse, increasingly 
 compared to that of an individual whose actions are directed by automatic impulses 
which he/she was incapable of resisting. On the basis of these  conclusions, it was 
generally recognised that the sleepwalker could be punished for his/her acts. In the 
final decades of the nineteenth century, psychiatry often resorted to this theory of 
automatisms to make sense of a number of hardly explicable criminal deeds. Or 
better still, the sleepwalking paradigm was used to define several states of torpor of 
the  consciousness that seemed to take on the aspect of a real animated dream.
So, criminal deeds,  committed by persons in somnambulistic  condition, entered 
into the courtrooms with some emblematic cases, that were repeated countless times 
in the medical and legal literature of those years. One of these was the case of young 
D., arrested in France for offences against decency and sentenced to three months 
in prison, who was saved at the last minute by Dr Auguste Motet. In fact, during the 
appeal hearing, Motet wrote a report based on his psychiatric examination for the 
defendant which aimed at showing that the defendant was in a state of unconsciousness 
at the moment of the deed against decency. Motet had known the young man before 
at the Saint-Antoine hospital, where his colleague Ernest Mesnet used to hypnotize 
him. But the two policemen who arrested him persisted in  considering that D., 
at the moment of his arrest, was consciously  committing an act against decency. 
The public prosecutor himself, developing his  conclusions, recognised that the 
subject sometimes lived in a mental state where  consciousness was absent, but did 
not  consider that this  condition was proved to be present at the moment when the 
defendant was seen by the two representatives of the law. At this moment Motet 
asked for permission to perform an experiment to show the  defendant’s liability to be 
influenced by the Court. So, the judges and the lawyers retired into a secluded room 
and watched a real show put on by the expert physician. After having hypnotized D., 
Motet asked him to repeat the same gestures that he was performing at the moment 
he was arrested. D., obviously in a state of trance, did not hesitate to unbutton his 
19 Fodéré (1813, vol. 1, pp. 256 sq.).
20 Hoffbauer (1827, p. 169). Esquirol and Itard, annotating the French edition of  Hoffbauer’s book – 
here quoted – asserted that, during the awake state, some thoughts could find their realization in the 
somnambulistic phase. For this reason the sleepwalker could not be treated leniently by the criminal 
justice system (p. 171).
21 About this subject see Alimena (1896, p. 124).
22 Tissot (1860, vol. 1, p. 40).
23 Briand (1821).
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trousers. The defendant was immediately stopped, but this was enough to acquit him 
of the charge for which he had been  convicted at the lower court.24 Another case 
was that of a young thief (studied by Ernest Mesnet) who was arrested after being 
caught stealing some furniture from a shop close to his home. Despite being caught 
in the act, he protested his innocence, but his behaviour was manifestly incoherent. 
Even during questioning, the attitude of this thief seemed bizarre. For this reason 
the police sent him to the Hotel-Dieu, which at that time was under the leadership 
of Mesnet. The physicians who had him under observation immediately realised 
that the young man was often seized by attacks of somnambulism, during which he 
even  contemplated suicide. At this point, it was Mesnet himself who forced him to 
undergo several hypnotic experiments from which Mesnet came to the firm belief 
that in presence of particular  conditions the subject lost his own will and became 
a blind tool for any idea that dominated him.25 Finally there was the case of the 
girl from Macerata in Italy, Teresa G., who had killed her son in a somnambulistic 
fit, but was acquitted because she was  considered absolutely lacking any capacity 
to  control her will at the moment of the crime.26 And this story, with all its human 
tragedy was related in the specialized literature at that time to reassert the principle 
of total irresponsability of the sleepwalker in relation to crimes  committed during 
the somnambulistic state.27
3. PATHOLOGIES OF THE WILL AND THE QUESTION
OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
Let us leave the case of Felida and other medical cases in the background for the 
moment to broaden the field of observation of our analysis. From the medico-legal 
perspective, the problems arising from a phenomenon like split personality are of 
 considerable importance, but we are only able to understand them if we put them 
into a wider  context. 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, psychiatric science had started to 
develop its observations by  continually engaging with the legal world. The area 
where the two disciplines tended to overlap was not just that of liability over the 
definition of the border between normality and anormality. As Michel Foucault said, 
during this century psychiatry tended to develop increasingly towards legal medicin. 
Its analyses  continuously fluctuated between the description of proper  conduct and 
the medical analysis of abnormalities. It developed, essentially, into a science and 
technique of identifying abnormal behavior, thus establishing a link between crime 
and madness. From that moment, the  connection between crime and mental illness 
no longer delinated the outer limits of the sphere of psychiatry, but rather one of its 
core  concerns.28 Beyond this observation, medicine and law  converged and often 
came into  conflict just over the topic of liability. Again, the birth of a discipline like 
criminology – an original product of the last decades of the nineteenth-century – 
24 Motet (1881).
25 Mesnet (1887).
26 Lapponi (1883) (before published in Bollettino delle scienze mediche di Bologna, 1883, 10). 
27 Gilles de la Tourette (1889, p. 211) ; Liégeois (1889 p. 595).
28 Foucault (2007, p. 147-148). See also Marchetti (2009).
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only becomes understandable as part of a process of  constant interaction between 
different fields of knowledge (notably medicine and law) and their diverging 
approaches to the question of liability.29
In any case, the identification of new pathologies, that clashed with the way in 
which alienists of the ancien régime had traditionally secluded the space of mental 
illness, made the problem of criminal liability more  complex. After all, medicine and 
law had no points of friction until medical science began to  consider mental illness 
as a temporary or permanent absence of the faculties of reason. The ‘madman’ was 
an easily recognizable subject (even by whoever did not have particular clinical 
skill) because his reasoning and behavior showed themselves lacking any  connection 
with reality. However this  conception of mental illness was  confronted with a lot 
of problems when strange pathologies like monomania, and later ‘moral insanity’, 
became the object of observation and research in psychiatric science. In these cases, 
it was not so difficult to realize that, despite the examined subjects having an intact 
mind, he/she were unable to restrain his/her impulses to  commit actions  contrary to 
the norms of behavior whose social value was generally accepted.
All over France a debate developed on the topic of monomania. Over time people 
lost interest in this phenomenon and it was replaced by debates on ‘moral insanity’.30 
This is the most obvious evidence of the fact that legal categories were inadequate to 
provide an exact position on criminal responsibility in relation to certain behaviors 
whose psychiatric nature was not easy to grasp.31 According to Article 64 of the French 
Penal Code, which inspired almost all the penal legislation in  continental Europe, 
“There is no crime nor punishment if the defendant was in a state of madness when 
he  committed the action, or if he was pushed by a strength to which he was unable 
to resist”. The Penal Code thereby defined the terms of individual responsibility 
and established a close correlation between responsibility and rationality.32 In this 
 context, behavior like that of the monomaniac (characterized by a lack of delirium 
and a peculiar clearness of mind) seemed to go beyond the application of the rule. 
Even  considering that the mentioning of the “irresistible strength”, to which the 
article referred, was generally intended as external irresistible strength, and this to 
avoid that the argument for legal non-accountability could be invoked to justify 
crimes of passion. But psychiatric science moved in the direction of recognising the 
full pathological nature of monomania, while abandoning even the notion of partial 
insanity that had initially characterized descriptions of this illness.33 In this sense 
mental illness was understood as localized in a symptom, that could happen only 
to a totally insane person.34 This  conclusion placed itself in opposition to several 
legislative proposals in order to allow reduced criminal liability and therefore 
punishability with regard to the partially insane.35
29 Harris (1988, p. 3).
30 About this subject see Fornari (1997, 1988) ; Babini (1982, pp. 153-154).
31 On this subject see the article published by Carlo Livi  concerning monomania and sent “A’ giurispe-
riti piuttosto che a’ medici” (Livi, 1876, 2, pp. 394-415 and 639-660).
32 Castel (1980, chap. 3 and 4).
33 See Tamassia (1876).
34 Foucault (2007, pp. 142-143).
35 As in the case of the Italian penal code of 1889, Babini (1982, pp. 153-154).
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In the 1880s, the subject of monomania was almost  completely marginalized 
from scientific discourse and the issue of moral insanity took centre stage. Also 
on this new pathology, were medicine and law unable to speak the same language. 
Moreover psychiatric science faced difficulties agreeing on the nature of the 
behavioral disorder itself,36 and this pathology appeared hardly definable in judicial 
terms. The morally insane man was a lucidly malicious person, aggressive, violent, 
lacking in moral scruples and insensitive to  common human sentiments. His mind, 
in other words, remained totally intact, even if he was unable to  control his behavior 
through of his will. But also in this case, justice invariably asked the same question 
to medical science, as it wanted to know whether the morally insane person was 
responsible for his own actions, thus identifying a boundary between the criminal 
and the non-responsible person.
The sense of disorientation that the “discovery” of these new psychiatric 
pathologies produced in the juridical sphere is demonstrated by the difficulties that 
the legislators, who were involved in reforming the penal law in many European 
countries, faced in their attempt to provide an adequate legislative form to the topic 
of criminal liability. None of the established definitions seemed suited to give the 
right importance to the role that the will (in its various abnormal expressions) had 
in the beginning and in the full manifestation of pathological behaviors. As Carlo 
Livi reminded us in an article published in the Rivista sperimentale di freniatria 
in the 1877,37 the forms proposed until then did not  consider one of the central 
elements of madness, that is to say, the loss of ability by the affected person to 
 control his/her own will. According to Livi, whoever tried to reassert the loss of 
reasoning as an exclusive and central criterion on which to assess whether a person 
could be held criminally responsible, reaffirmed past prejudices which proposed that 
the premeditation and the preparation of a crime always involved  culpability, not 
realizing that the essence of madness lay in a lesion of the will rather than of the 
 consciousness. The admonishment of Livi did not seem totally unwarranted, given 
the difficulty of Italian psychiatry in persuading judges about the pathological nature 
of certain forms of behaviour that seemed more the fruit of lucid malevolence than 
of a diseased mind.
 Livi’s worry did not only involve Italian psychiatry. Krafft-Ebing himself used a 
lot of pages of his Treatise of forensic psychopathology (a Bible of forensic medicine 
at that time) to  confute several opinions that circulated  concerning the symptoms of 
madness ; opinions which he suggested had long been the base for diagnosis or the 
suspicion of insanity.38 Livi was thus refuting the idea that the action of a madman 
never had a reasonable and specific cause, unlike the healthy person. He also objected 
to the opinion that certain actions could be isolated in the life of a man, in  contrast 
with all the other displays of his behaviour. Similarly with the notion that the “crazy” 
action excluded, by its nature, premeditation, calculation and caution ploy, as well as 
awareness of his/her own guilt and repentance, or the idea that individuals in a state 
of madness were incapable of carrying out reasoned discours.
The reference to Carlo Livi and to the Italian medical-legal science is not 
fortuitous. Since Italian national unification in 1861 an intense debate had developed 
36 About the Italian debate on moral insanity see Babini (1982, pp. 167sq.)
37 Livi (1877).
38 Krafft-Ebing von (1897).
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about reform of the penal code that ended only in 1889, when the “Zanardelli code” 
was promulgated. Thus Italy may be  considered an interesting laboratory for penal 
law in the European  context.39
In any case, even if legislators in Italy arrived at the formulation of an article 
(article 46 of the Penal Code of 1889) in which they distinguished between awareness 
and will of an action, without emphasizing the  controversial notion of free will,40 the 
legislative openness to these new positions of psychiatric science was very cautious. 
In fact, in some way, it left unsolved the main issues that medical science of the late 
nineteenth century had opened some decades before This shows how hard it was for 
the law to accept the pathologization of an aspect of human life such as the will, for 
which the psychiatric categories remained largely inconclusive.
This short analysis reveals the difficulties that law, more than medicine, faced 
in evaluating the volitive function as a fundamental element of criminal liability. 
This allows us to understand how difficult it was to approach a case like that of 
Felida X with legal  concepts. Similarly in cases of split personality where the 
mental faculties remained intact, while even the capacity of these persons to decide 
seemed not to be injured in any essential way. At most, it was necessary to decide 
what was the core of the personality to which one might attribute responsibility 
for any criminal act. And this problem was closely linked to that of establishing 
whether an abnomality, such as split personality, could be  considered a behavioural 
disorder that  comprehensively damaged the mental faculties of the person who 
suffered from it. After all, as Krafft-Ebing, speaking about the role assigned to the 
examining physician in trials involing such cases, asserted that the function of the 
psychiatric examination was not to express a judgment on “responsibility [nor] free 
will, but [on] the determination of the integrity or of the mental illness, by means 
of scientific analysis”.41
From this point of view, the attempt to define a clear demarcation line between 
health and madness was a task with which psychiatric science engaged throughout 
the better part of the nineteenth century. And the obsession of Cesare Lombroso for 
discovering some biological and behavioral marks that could determine beyond any 
doubt the difference between normality and abnormality was only a reflection of a 
more general trend.42
Beyond appearances, however, even this issue met with several difficulties. 
Modern psychiatric science, from the very beginning, ran into a problem which 
was not easy to solve. According to Esquirol – who, with his master Pinel, can 
be  considered at the origin of the definition of a new disciplinary dimension of 
psychiatric science – it was impossible to clearly distinguish the  condition of the 
‘madman’ from that of the healthy man. Between the two tendencies existed a line 
of  continuity. It is true that this idea of a  continuum between normality and insanity 
was almost immediately denied by Georget, the most highly regarded pupil of 
39 On this subject see Sbriccoli (1998, pp. 487-551).
40 “He who is not punishable, at the moment he  committed the action, was in such a state of mental 
illness as to deprive him of the  consciousness or the will of his own acts”. On the origins of article 
46 and regarding the influence that the Tuscan penal  culture had on the final wording of the rule, see 
Dezza (1991, 21, 1, pp. 131-158, now in Id., Saggi di storia del diritto penale moderno, Milano, Led 
Edizioni Universitarie, 1992, pp. 281-316).
41 Krafft-Ebing (1897, p. 27).
42 About Cesare Lombroso see Marchetti (2012a, pp. 366-370, 2012b, pp. 69-96).
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Esquirol, who developed his discourse about insanity by  complying with a strictly 
physiological  concept of mental illness. But it is also true that Georget himself was 
not entirely capable of reversing this ‘scandal’ sparked by the assertion that there 
was a line of  continuity between normality and madness. Accordingly this kind of 
heuristic perplexity characterized psychiatric knowledge (even if in an underground 
way) since its origins.43
4. THE EGO IN PIECES
The case of Felida X and the phenomenon of split personality – topics which 
have been increasingly studied in recent years – allow us to understand how the 
attempt at identifying a clear demarcation line between normality and pathology was 
destined not to survive scholarly  confrontations over a dimension of human psyche 
which had previously been unknown.44 A dimension that seemed to challenge the 
idea of oneness of the Ego – and not only in cases of obvious mental illness – as 
well as the predominance of the  conscious activity in human behaviour. In other 
words, a new way of  conceiving the mind was emerging, based on the dual nature 
of  conscious and unconscious psychological processes. This was a way of thinking 
about the mind that had already had philosophical manifestations in the doctrines of 
Schopenauer and Hartmann.45
Regarding this ‘fragmentation’ of the Ego, the studies done by Théodule Ribot 
at the end of nineteenth century seemed to show the existence of the human mind 
coinceived as an unsettled whole of elements and functions, potentially independent 
and  continuously threatened by a loss of balance, which is a prelude to mental illness. 
In his essay  concerning the Maladies de la personalité (published in the 1885) the 
French psychologist severely criticized the philosophical  conception of the  soul’s 
oneness and the idea of its separation from the body. According to Ribot, personality 
was nothing but a  combination of elements in a state of flux, and this gave to the Ego 
the inconstancy and variability of the living being.46
Phenomena like the change of personality or hypnosis allowed us to see how 
small the difference was between the pathological and normal  condition, which both 
could be ruled by non- conscious processes. This was the  conclusion, for instance, 
that the later Nobel prize-winner for medicine, Charles Richet, had reached.47 Gabriel 
Tarde himself – who always showed a great interest in these topics – did not fail to 
stress the possible repercussions that this new model of the human mind, proposed 
by a significant sector of nineteenth-century medicine, could produce in relation to 
criminal liability.48 The discovery of multiple personalities caught the imagination of 
the scientists at that time so much as to push both young researchers into this field of 
43 On  Esquirol’s intuition, later denied in occasion of some sensational judicial vicissitudes, see Gauchet 
(1997, pp. 35sq.) On this subject see also Galzigna (2008, pp. IX-XXXI).
44 Jacqueline Carroy speaks about the “subject invention” as a  condition of existence of the psychology 
 considered as a new autonomous science (Carroy, 1991).
45 Ellenberger (1976, vol. 1, p. 366). An interesting point of view about the ‘discovery’ of the uncon-
scious and the loss of the unity of the Ego (dated back, according to this author, to some intuitions of 
Jean Pierre Farlet) is offered by Gauchet (1997, pp. 39sq.).
46 Babini (1996, p. 30).
47 Richet (1884).
48 Tarde (1889, 2, pp. 449-469). On this subject see Chertok, De Saussure (1975, p. 210).
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research, like Pierre Janet in France49 or Max Dessoir in Germany50, and well-known 
scholars such as Alfred Binet, for whom in the case of split personality the subject 
lost his own  consciousness and responsibility to become a kind of automaton, a blind 
tool in the hands of his brain.51
The explanation given for these phenomena oscilated between two interpretive 
lines. Initially they advanced the hypothesis that every person was occupied by 
different personalities, but this position lost influence over the years. In the theory of 
Jules Janet,52 for instance – who had examined the case of Blanche Witt, a hysteric 
with a split personality – everyone was endowed with a double Ego. The healthy 
state was characterized by a  condition of equilibrium in which the underground 
personality was not able to prevail. If this equilibrium vanished – this might be for 
several reasons such as the onset of an illness – the second personality could surface 
forcefully ; and so, according to Jules Janet, the second Ego, taking advantage of the 
weakness of the first personality, could catch a train, go to London and kill a man 
without his first personality having any memory of it.53 But the hypothesis of Pierre 
Janet ( Jules’s brother, destined to greater fame) had greater credit. For Janet, some 
psychic automatisms existed in all persons, outside the  control of  consciousness, 
and under particular circumstances they could enter into action in the life of every 
individual, and determine his behavior.54
According to both hypotheses they assumed that a certain degree of mental 
break-up was  constantly present in the life of every man, even if it remained difficult 
to establish when this break-up might give rise to a real split in the personality.55 
Thus, the idea of the existence of a subconscious level inside every person, which is 
able to generate impulses outside the  control of  consciousness, seemed to break up 
the reassuring unitary view of the human psyche. From the legal point of view it was 
impossible not to  consider “cette rupture de  l’unité du moi pour la délimitation de la 
responsabilité morale”.56
Among legal scholars, the idea of the existence of different psychological forces 
which were not  controlled by a person, whether healthy or ill, could not be easily 
accepted.57 Medicine and law were only able to speak the same language if they 
made reference to an identical view of the human being. The unity of the Ego and the 
dominance of  consciousness had represented, until then, a shared anthropological 
model. Only within the parametres of this model could a suitable answer be obtained 
to the request made to psychiatric experts by judges to locate, through the dichotomy 
normality/madness, the dividing line between criminal liability/ or unaccountability. 
From this point of view the ‘discovery’ of new pathologies such as monomania 
and moral insanity (with their claim to pathologize the volitive function in human 
behavior) had stretched the boundaries to breaking point, within which law could 
49 Janet (2013).
50 Dessoir (1890).
51 Binet (1892, p. 43).
52 Janet (1888).
53 Janet (1888, p. 621).
54 Janet (1889, pp. 133sq.).
55 De Sarlo (1890, p. 378).
56 Morand (1889, p. 385).
57 On this subject see Marchetti (2014).
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accept the new course of modern psychiatry in the courtrooms. However, the 
discovery of a new unconscious dimension in the psychological activity in human 
beings inevitably collided with the view of a person who is able to determine his 
own actions with  consciousness, to whom law, in its punitive claim, had always 
made reference.58
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